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medium-term issues.I. Situation and Prospects for the European Economy
World economic activity remains relatively ro-
bust, although the Asian crisis casts a shadow
over the picture. The rate of growth of world
trade has slowed down since last fall, but is ex-
pected to remain above its trend level. Interna-
tional price developments remain quite moder-
ate. Oil prices have declined substantially, and
are among the lowest of the decade. Inflationary
pressures are also limited in the industrial
countries, as capacity constraints are not yet sig-
nificant there and excess supply has material-
ized worldwide. The industrial countries show a
sustained growth rate between 2Vi and 3 per
cent on average. However, the combination of
strong growth and low inflation is the result of
divergent developments between countries.
• The US economy has been until recently par-
ticularly buoyant, as strong domestic demand
has more than offset the dampening effect of
falling exports to Asia. The Japanese economy
remains in the doldrums. The threat of a defla-
tion has recently prompted a substantial stimu-
lation programme aiming at preventing a further
deterioration of confidence. \^
Economic growth in Asia has been-severely_
restricted, in particular in the ASEAN countries
and Korea, although extensive rescue opera-
tions have brought the situation in the worst hit
countries more or less under control. The im-
pact on the European countries is as yet rather
limited, as negative trade effects are largely
compensated for by beneficial effects of lower
imported inflation and lower interest rates.
Thus Western Europe is in a position to sus-
tain the recovery that began in mid-1996. Pros-
pects have been strengthened as uncertainties
associated with the implementation of the EMU
have now been dissipated. The time has now
come to begin to view the EMU countries as a
single entity from the viewpoint of economic
management, even if differences persist in many
fields.
1. External Environment
a. Relatively Small Effects on Europe of
the Asian Crisis
The turmoil on the Asian currency and stock
markets worsened in the final months of last
year. The crisis spread from the ASEAN-4
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Thailand) to other countries in the region,
notably to South Korea. When the Japanese fi-
nancial markets were subsequently hit as well,
the problem took on a more than regional di-
mension. The financial crisis led to significant
declines in exchange rates that were caused by a
major reduction of capital flows into the region.
This change has helped to reduce real interest
rates and strengthen equity prices in the OECD,
offsetting some of the effects of the crisis.
Extensive international rescue operations, led
by the IMF, seem to have brought the situation
more or less under control and to have helped to
prevent the crisis spreading to other regions. In
Indonesia, however, the situation remains wor-
rying, while social unrest has recently devel-
oped in South Korea.
The depth and the duration of the crisis re-
main uncertain. In our projection it is assumed
that during this year a basis will be established
in the most affected countries for a restoration
of confidence. Thus the crisis will be bottoming
out, and the area will enter a gradual export-led
recovery with positive growth returning to all
countries involved. The volume of GDP in the
ASEAN-4 will drop substantially this year and
show only a marginal increase next year. In par-
ticular these countries have had to reduce their
external deficits, at first mainly by a compres-
sion of domestic demand and drastic import
cuts. An export boom has so far been hampered
by credit shortages. However, those countries
can profit from improved competitiveness. The
impact of the crisis on other Asian countries is
essentially smaller. Economic growth in Asia
excluding Japan may pick up from 3V2 per cent
this year to 4*72-5 per cent next year.Weaker demand in the adapting countries has
lowered the net exports of their trading part-
ners. Developing and transition countries are
most affected, because their goods compete di-
rectly with Asian goods. Moreover, they are
most vulnerable to financial disturbances, whilst
foreign investors and banks now are more aware
of the risks in these markets. There have also
been effects on industrial countries. The Asians
economies are importing less, and their cheaper
goods are driving out western products. The im-
pact on output in the affected countries depends
primarily on two factors, namely the import-
ance of Asia as an export destination and the
importance of trade for the national economy.
The adverse effects on growth should not be
overestimated. Trade with the ASEAN-4 and
Korea accounts for less than 1 per cent of the
industrial countries' GDP (Table 1). Moreover,
the loss of output is compensated in most coun-
tries by lower inflation and lower interest rates.
Europe is not very vulnerable to setbacks in
Asia, as only a relatively small proportion of
exports is destined for that region, and the share
of Asia in imports is not large. The impact on
GDP growth may be limited to about a\quarter
of a percentage point this year, as long as^eco-
nomic policy responses continue to be appropri-
ate, and the crisis does not spill over to other
Asian and developing countries.
The Asian crisis has a depressing effect on
the prices of manufactures. The usual assump-
tion is that Asian suppliers are price followers,
which means that trade prices do not neces-
sarily change with shifting exchange rates. But
nominal depreciations vis-a-vis the dollar rang-
ing from 40 to 75 per cent mean that this is not
very plausible. However, the effect on prices
will be much smaller than suggested by these
depreciations. First, exchange rates have depre-
ciated much less in effective terms, as these
countries have significant trade with each other
and with other countries with weak currencies.
Second, the real effective depreciation is much
smaller, as production costs of exportables will
rise because of higher import prices (depending
on the share of imported inputs), while infla-
tionary pressure on domestic inputs will tend to
erode the competitiveness gain. Third, Asian
firms might prefer a widening of profit margins
over market gains.
For the non-industrial world as a whole the
effective depreciation is less than 10 per cent on
average, but these shifts in exchange rates will
have a significant impact on patterns of compe-
titiveness. For the developing world excluding
OPEC the terms-of-trade loss due to exchange
rate changes is estimated at some 3 per cent. Of
the industrial countries in particular the compe-
titive position of the United States will have
weakened. For Europe the impact is much smal-
ler, given the smaller share of Asia in its trade.
For Japan on the other end the boost to compe-
titiveness from the depreciation against the in-
dustrial countries is broadly offset by the appre-
ciation against the currencies in the Asian region.

















































































































Source: Econometric Model of NIESR (NIGEM).
However, direct patterns of trade are not the
only thing to take into account in assessing the
effects of the Asian crisis. Table 2 shows with
whom Korea, for instance, competes in third
markets. Although direct trade between Europe
and Korea is low they are major competitors in
US markets, for instance.
b. No Fundamental Improvement in
Japan
There were strong recessionary tendencies in
Japan during the second half of 1997 caused
mainly by fiscal tightening, the consequences of
the Asian crisis, and the implications of finan-
cial deregulation. Fiscal policy was tightened
by over 2 per cent of GDP in the third quarter.
The restructuring of financial markets made the
problems of the banks and pension funds more
transparent, and consequently affected consumer
confidence and reduced spending. In March
1998, manufacturing production was 9 per cent
below the peak level of mid-1997. Domestic de-
mand was reduced by a sharp fall of the resi-
dential investment and household consumption
(especially after December 1997, the period of
distribution of bonus payments). These devel-
opments induced a decline of corporate profits
(about 2.2 per cent among large non-financial
companies, for the fiscal year which closes in
March 1998), a downturn of productive invest-
ment, and a slowdown in wage growth. During
the first quarter of 1998, domestic demand has
stabilized at a low level. In addition, the slump
in Asian imports since the beginning of 1998
has worsened overall demand. In these circum-
stances, inventory-sales ratios are shooting up
and the decline in domestic production prices is
picking up speed. In addition, the growing shaki-
ness of the banking system has induced a credit
squeeze, especially toward small and medium-
sized enterprises.
The level of activity in Japan in past years
has been strongly affected by large swings in
the stance of fiscal policy. In April 1998, the
government proposed amendments to the Fiscal
Structural Reform Act, postponing the target for
discontinuing deficit-covering bonds issuance,
and removing caps on social welfare spending.
The additional measures officially announced
on April 24, amount to 16.65 trillion yen (3.3
per cent of GDP). However, the stimulating im-
pact of the fiscal package is likely to be less
pronounced than it might appear as the originalbudget incorporated a significant negative im-
pact on domestic demand. If one third of the
public works package becomes effective this
year, public investment might stagnate instead
of decreasing by 7 per cent (as planned in the
original budget). Next year public investment
might experience only a small increase. In addi-
tion, half of the current 4 trillion yen fiscal re-
bate was already planned, and hence the addi-
tional 2 trillion rebate that will occur next year
implies that tax policy will be neutral.
In a context of persistent deflationary tenden-
cies, monetary policy will remain expansionary
in 1998 as well as 1999. However, low interest
rates will not stimulate credit demand because
of the weakness of the banking system. As a con-
sequence the credit squeeze will encourage com-
panies to improve self-financing, which may im-
ply further labour market and wage adjustment.
Nominal wage growth (including bonuses
and overtime payments) has decelerated since
mid-1997. In the first months of 1998 even re-
gular wages were no higher than a year ago. De-
creasing overtime and a reduction of bonus pay-
ments (indexed on company profits) have fur-
ther worsened the situation. In addition, increas-
ing unemployment (which has reached 3.9 per
cent in March) has helped to prevent a decrease
in the savings rate.
The expected stabilization of the exports to
other Asian countries will help total exports to
gradually recover. A slight depreciation of the
yen vis-a-vis the dollar will also have a positive
effect. Domestic demand is likely to be rather
weak as the fiscal stimulation package will only
have its full impact in 1999. Capital spending
will decline this year and gradually increase
thereafter. Consumption is likely to be weak as
unemployment will pick up. Consequently there
will be only a small increase in real GDP in
1998 and a somewhat faster growth in 1999.
c. United States: Growth Is Losing
Momentum
According to the preliminary estimates for the
first quarter of 1998, growth continued to be
strong as compared to the fourth quarter of
1997. Real GDP increased at an annualized rate
of 4.8 per cent. Personal consumption expendi-
tures accelerated further and there was a sharp
rebound in non-residential investment led by
producers' durable equipment. Also residential
investment performed rather favourably. Con-
trary to that, there was a negative contribution
of net exports due to the impact of the Asian
crisis and the appreciation of the US dollar. Im-
ports were soaring while exports weakened sig-
nificantly. Businesses have continued to in-
crease inventories: they nevertheless remain in
check with regard to sales. Inflation is still very
moderate, with consumer prices in April in-
creasing by 1.5 per cent over the preceding
year. The fall of the unemployment rate to 4.3
per cent in April indicates that the labour mar-
ket is getting tighter. However, the sharp de-
cline from the level of March (4.7 per cent) is
mainly due to a decline in the labour force
rather than an increase in employment.
The Federal Reserve Board decided not to in-
crease interest rates at its meeting in May. It be-
lieves that inflationary dangers are small, and
that strong growth in GDP in the first quarter
was mainly related to the mild winter weather.
As declining net exports will put a further drag
on the economy, an increase in interest rates is
being given a low probability. The outlook for
fiscal policy never appeared so good for the fis-
cal year ending next September with a surplus
on the Federal Budget of the order of $43-$63
billion according to the last estimates of the
Congressional Budget Office. The stance of fis-
cal policy is likely to be neutral in this fiscal
year.
The US economy appears to be operating at
or above capacity. As a result, tensions on wag-
es have begun to materialize. Increases in la-
bour costs accelerated at the end of 1997 and
are now higher than the inflation rate. Real
wages are likely to grow slightly faster than pro-
ductivity over the next year.
Less favourable export prospects, following
in part from the recent strength of the dollar,
and rising unit labour costs will worsen the pros-
pects for production and investment. Wealth ef-
fects will no longer have such a strong impact
on consumption, and hence the savings rate
may rise. These factors will lead to a modera-tion of output growth in the course of this year.
Real GDP will nevertheless increase on average
by 3 per cent in 1998. In 1999, real GDP
growth will slow down to 2 per cent. Lower
profit growth will induce lower growth of cor-
porate investment and we expect that inven-
tories will be reduced. The projected slight de-
preciation of the US dollar, the recovery in
Southeast Asia, and the broadening of the up-
swing in Europe together with a smaller in-
crease in domestic demand will lead to a posi-
tive contribution of net exports to growth. The
unemployment rate will gradually increase, but
despite this inflation will be increased by the
rise in import prices.
d. World Trade Slows Down and Raw
Material Prices Remain Subdued
Last year the volume of world trade grew by
about 10 per cent (Table 3). In particular North
and South America recorded very dynamic
trade developments. Asia, Western Europe, and
the transition countries all recorded stronger
growth than in the previous year. However, this
rapid expansion will not be sustained because
of the Asian crisis and the expected slowdown
of the American economy. Although the impact
of the crisis will be diminishing rather soon,
next year's trade will also be affected, in parti-
cular flows within the Asian region will be re-
duced. Total world trade growth will slow to
some 6V2 per cent in 1998 and 1999, while in-
ternational prices will move quite modestly.
The Asian crisis has caused a sharp decelera-
tion in growth of world trade, and depressed
prices. Asia including Japan accounts for about
a quarter of total world trade (Table 4). The ef-
fects are most apparent for Asia itself, because
the bulk of the trade of the Asian countries re-
mains within the area.
In most Western European countries, exports
are still booming, but growth is expected to mo-
derate. The effects of last year's improved com-
petitiveness are ebbing away, and the Asian
crisis has intensified international competition.
At the same time import demand is weakening
in the United States and in Asia. However, ex-
ports are not very vulnerable to setbacks in that
region, and the Asian share in European im-
ports is not large.
Table 3 - World Trade, 1997-1999
Percentage change
World trade volume, goods
Export market growth EU
a
World trade prices, $











































2In the past few years, Europe's cyclical re-
covery was substantially supported by exports,
but the contribution of net exports is rapidly di-
minishing. Export growth of the area will de-
velop largely in line with market growth, slow-
ing from 9 per cent in 1997 to 7 per cent this
year and some 6
lA per cent next year.
Western European imports are gradually de-
celerating, from 71/2 per cent last year to 6V2 per
cent next year. Most countries show the same
profile. Weakening domestic demand is reflec-
ted in slow import demand in the United King-
dom, Norway, and Denmark. In other countries
a slight pick-up in domestic demand may lead
to a smaller contribution of net exports to
growth.
Primary commodity prices in dollar terms de-
creased sharply in late 1997 and early this year,
in part because of the collapse in demand in
East Asia. The potential spread of the Asian
crisis has made manufacturers reluctant to re-
plenish inventories. Also the rise of the dollar
has depressed dollar-denominated prices. The
sharp fall in oil prices was the result of weak
energy demand because of a mild winter in the
Northern hemisphere, and rising OPEC produc-
tion. For 1998 and 1999 only a small rise in
commodity prices is expected, given the slower
pace of the world economy, especially in Asia.
For crude oil, copper, and oilseeds the share of
the five worst hit countries in world imports
was 8 per .cent, and for grains, sugar, and lead
10 to 12 per cent. Asian suppliers, on the other
hand, will shift towards the industrial export
markets, helping to reduce the prices of rubber
and tin in particular.
Although weakening demand has led to over-
capacity, dollar prices may pick up somewhat,
supported by the recovery in the transition
countries, and the continued upswing in Wes-
tern Europe, who are major consumers of raw
materials. Moreover, the moderating effect of
the rising dollar will vanish. Year on year, com-
modity prices will still drop substantially in
1998.
The decline in energy prices became steeper
at the end of last year. In November OPEC de-
cided to raise production quotas by about 10 per
cent starting January 1998. This is one of the
reasons why in March the oil price dropped by
30 per cent to a level of around $13 per barrel.
Other reasons were weak demand from Asia
and the mild winter in the Northern hemisphere.
In reaction, OPEC and non-OPEC countries an-
nounced a plan to reduce oil production by
around 2 million barrels per day. However, the
prospects for a strong price recovery are rather
small. World activity is slowing this year, and
oil stocks are above . normal. Consequently,
world oil demand will be only 2 per cent higher
this year than in 1997. Assuming that the agreed
supply reductions will come in time, prices may
slightly recover in the second half of this year
and remain at around that level next year.
e. Recovery in Transition Countries
Broadens
In the transition countries in Central and Eas-
tern Europe output growth slowed down some-
what in 1997. Tightening of monetary and fis-
cal policy has meant that growth of domestic
demand has decelerated. On the other hand ex-
ports expanded more rapidly as the upswing in
Western Europe gained momentum. The change
in the driving forces helped to slightly reduce
external deficits. High current account deficits,
upward pressures on currencies, and weaknes-
ses in the banking system make some of these
countries vulnerable. In 1998 and 1999 output
growth is likely to be in the order of 4 to 4.5 per
cent, compared to 3.3 per cent in 1997. Coun-
tries like Romania and Bulgaria may show some
positive growth. Labour markets there will show
only a small improvement, and inflation will
slow down further, but nevertheless remain
high. Growth in the Accession countries Po-
land, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia, and the
Czech Republic has generally been strong, with
the first two showing particular promise. For-
eign direct investment has shown a strong up-
turn recently, in part because of closer ties to
the EU.
In the CIS countries the decline of output has
come to a halt in 1997 and there was remark-
able progress with respect to reducing inflation
while fiscal deficits became larger again. At
present the Russian economy seems to be ratherfragile also because it is heavily dependent on
oil revenues. The central bank had to raise in-
terest rates dramatically, the lombard rate
amounts to 150 per cent, now. However, with
the expected stabilization of oil prices the pres-
ent turmoil in the financial markets is likely to
calm down again. All in all a small positive
growth rate of real GDP may occur. Employ-
ment will fall further and unemployment will
keep on rising.
2. Western Europe
a. The Upturn in Western Europe
Continues
In the course of 1997 the cyclical upswing in
Western Europe regained momentum after it
had been interrupted in 1995 and 1996, due to a
marked appreciation of most European curren-
Box 1 - Potential Output and Output Gaps in EMU Countries
The stage of the business cycle in the EMU area will be an important indicator for the European Central Bank (ECB)
with respect to its interest policy. As long as there is sufficient slack in the economy an acceleration of inflation is
not likely to occur. At present inflation risks are subdued, however, with output continuing to expand at a rapid pace
inflationary risks might increase in the future. It would therefore be helpful to know the trend growth of EMU econ-
omies and the corresponding output gaps. This would also help to determine structural budget deficits.
At present two different methods are used for this purpose. The first alternative involves smoothing real GDP us-
ing a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, this is based on calculating a weighted moving average of GDP including a four-
year forecast. The second approach, used for example by the OECD, is based on a production function relationship
and the factor inputs that are available to the economy. At present both methods give slightly conflicting results. Ac-
cording to the HP filter method capacity utilization in EMU was back to normal already in the course of 1997. Con-
trary to that the production function approach still indicates a negative output gap of about 1.5 per cent at the end of
1997 (graph). Since no full cycle is included into the analysis the HP filter is likely to have a bias towards under-
estimating trend growth and thus overall capacity utilization seems to be exaggerated somewhat. The production
function approach on the other hand seems to have a bias in the other direction as the utilization of factor inputs is
not only affected by cyclical but also by structural elements. These calculations suggest that there is a wide margin
of uncertainty.
EMU Countries : Output Gap
% output gap (deviation from the OECD potential GDP and Hodrick-Prescott filter)
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
Source: OECD, EBCA estimates.10
Box 1 continued
Germany
% output gap (deviation from the OECD potential GDP and HP filter)
liter
OEGD
1 FRfi before 19SJ1
France
% output gap (deviation from the OECD potential GDP and HP filter)
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
Italy
% output gap (deviation from the OECD potential GDP and HP filter)
Spain
% output gap (deviation from the OECD potential GDP and HP filter)
CECD
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
Netherlands
% output gap (deviation from the OECD potential GDP and HP filter)
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
United Kingdom
% output gap (deviation from the OECD potential GDP and HP filter)
OECD
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
Source: OECD, EBCA estimates.11
cies vis-a-vis the US dollar and a marked in-
crease in long-term interest rates which had oc-
curred in 1994. In the fourth quarter of last year
real GDP was about 3 per cent higher than a
year ago. The available information suggests
that overall economic growth in Western Europe
in the first quarter of this year was even stron-
ger. However, due to the mild winter weather
and specific factors, the first-quarter growth
somewhat overstates the underlying pace of the
recovery. The negative output gap for the EMU
area as a whole has closed further, following a
continuing rapid growth of industrial produc-
tion (Box 1). Employment increased slightly
and the number of unemployed decreased some-
what. Due to sharply declining energy and raw
material prices, price increases almost came to a
halt; according to the new harmonized index of
consumer prices set up by Eurostat the inflation
rate on a year over year basis was down to 1.2
per cent in March.
Within the EMU area there are pronounced
differences with respect to the current state of
the business cycle. In some of the smaller coun-
tries, Ireland, Finland, Portugal, and the Nether-
lands, and also in Spain, demand is expanding
more rapidly than in Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Germany, France, and Italy. The faster
growth in the smaller countries does not only
reflect a higher trend growth but also a more
advanced position in the business cycle. In ad-
dition the reduction in interest rates in Ireland,
Finland, and Portugal that is associated with the
EMU process will raise consumer demand.
During the winter, exports continued to be
the main driving force of the upswing although
growth rates have slowed down, in large part
due to declining exports to Southeast Asia. In
addition the stimulating effects of the recent ap-
preciation of the US dollar and the pound ster-
ling are getting smaller. However, slower ex-
port growth was fully compensated by a more
marked expansion of domestic demand. Im-
proving labour market prospects and a cessation
of the tightening of fiscal policy induced con-
sumption to grow more rapidly, with car regis-
tration showing an especially strong increase.
Corporate investment growth also picked up
considerably, supported by low interest rates,
rising capacity utilization, and improving sales
and profit expectations. However, residential
and public investment have not risen signifi-
cantly, but there are indications that there has
been some stabilization.
The short-term prospects are in favour of a
continuing upswing in the EMU countries. The
confidence of consumers and enterprises has
been rising, and the inflow of new orders has
remained in a clear upward trend. Even more
important is that the underlying conditions,
which are described below, remain favourable.
Monetary policy continues to support the up-
swing. The transition to EMU is likely to be
smooth. Low inflation, slightly appreciating cur-
rencies, and continuing moderate wage in-
creases suggest that interest rates in EMU coun-
tries will converge to the lower end of the range
amongst the members. In Italy, Spain, Portugal,
and Ireland short-term interest rates are likely to
fall in the course of the year while in Germany,
France, and other members there may be a mi-
nor rise in interest rates. At the end of the year,
in all EMU countries the three-month money
market rate will be close to 4 per cent. In the
course of next year the Institutes expect the
ECB to increase money market rates by half a
percentage point as output gaps close (Table 5).
Long-term interest rates are expected to pick
up somewhat already in the course of this year
and remain stable afterwards. With 10-year
bond yields edging up to 5.7 per cent next year
the overall financial conditions remain favour-
able. The expected slight increase in long-term
rates mainly reflects that with the stabilization
in Southeast Asia capital flows to 'safe havens'
in Europe and the US will reverse again.
As has been described above, conditions in
markets outside EMU have worsened some-
what. Lower output growth in Southeast Asia
and in North America will dampen export
growth, although with an expected stabilization,
the dampening effects will get smaller next
year. After a slowdown of growth rates in 1998
world trade in 1999 will expand at the same
rate. Despite the fact that the euro is expected to
appreciate slightly vis-a-vis the dollar the com-
petitive position of EMU countries will not de-
teriorate as unit labour costs will show only a
small increase.12





















aNorth-sea Brent in US$. —
















































In 1997 fiscal policy has had dampening ef-
fects on economic activity as in a number of
countries taxes were raised and expenditures
were cut in order to meet the Maastricht criteria
for the budget deficit. This year, governments
are not likely to give up their consolidation ef-
forts and they will continue to try keep expendi-
tures in check in order to further reduce the
level of public expenditures in relation to GDP.
On the revenue side, contrary to last year, there- -
will in only a few countries be increases in tax
rates and social contributions rates. Some coun-
tries will even lower taxes and contributions in
order to give some relief to the private sector.
All in all fiscal policy in 1998 and 1999 will be
more or less neutral.
In recent years wage growth has moderated
substantially and productivity growth has been
rather strong. In 1997 wages were 2.6 per cent
higher than a year ago. With the upswing con-
tinuing and the improvement in the labour mar-
ket the reduction in wage increases is likely to
slow down this year. Only in Italy and France
are pay increases expected to slow down some-
what. Next year wage growth will slightly accel-
erate towards a rate of about 3 per cent. Some
of those countries which are more advanced in
the business cycle may experience wage in-
creases above the average rate. As productivity
growth in EMU countries will slow gradually,
unit labour costs which have been declining
will again edge up slightly.
Against this background the upswing in
EMU countries is likely to continue in 1998 and
in 1999 at a rather solid pace (for the risks, see
Box 2). Real GDP will increase by 2.9 per cent
Box 2 - Risks Associated to the Forecast
As usual this forecast incorporates certain risks. A significant downward risk is still that the stabilization in South-
east Asia will take longer than assumed in this forecast. This would mean that the related drag on European exports
would be more pronounced..In addition, losses on loans to the East Asian economies could present some liquidity
problems in the European banking system. It cannot be excluded that confidence in the progress in the transition
countries could decline, creating financial turbulence in these countries and hampering recovery. Because of strong
trade links this would significantly affect exports of EMU countries in a negative way. Another risk to the forecast is
that, starting in the US, stock prices which have risen markedly in the last two years will decline. However, this
would only be a correction of overly optimistic expectations and not bear a major risk for the recovery in Europe.
The correction is likely to be smaller for Europe than for the US as the underlying conditions for profits remain fa-
vourable. Besides the downward risks there are also upward risks to the forecast. With the progress made in terms of
price level stability and sounder fiscal policy, interest rates in Europe may stay low for a longer time than anticipated
here. This would lead to a stronger acceleration of investment growth, consumer confidence and finally also real
GDP growth.i o t n e k
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in both years compared to a potential output
growth of slightly less than 2.5 per cent (Figure
1). Capacity utilization will thus rise further.
However, even at the end of next year it will on
average still be significantly lower than in the
boom at the end of the eighties. In some of the
smaller countries some tensions are likely to be-
come visible as they are more advanced in the
business cycle.
The upward momentum in the EMU countries
will increasingly be driven by domestic de-
mand. Export growth, in contrast, is likely to
slow down somewhat as growth in main trading
partner countries will be weaker than in 1997
and as the stimulus from the devaluation is
fading. Domestic demand will continue to ben-
efit from the stimulating effects of monetary
policy. Those countries where interest rates are
expected to be reduced further will get a strong
impulse on domestic demand. In 1998 real dis-
posable income of private households will be
increased through the slight improvement in the
terms of trade induced by lower raw material
prices and the stabilization of European ex-
change rates. Together with the turnaround in
the labour market consumer confidence in most
of the countries has increased significantly. Pri-
vate consumption will therefore support the up-
swing. In the presence of low interest rates, in-
creasing capacity utilization, and improving
profits corporate investment will remain brisk.
The upturn will be largely confined to invest-
ment in machinery and equipment, whereas in-
vestment growth in structures will be dampened
by the excess supply in office buildings.
In line with the continuing upswing employ-
ment will further rise. As a consequence unem-
ployment will go down somewhat. The average
unemployment rate is expected to go down by
about half a percentage point in both years.
Despite the improvement the number of unem-
ployed will still be around 14.5 million in 1999.
The price climate in EMU countries in gen-
eral will remain favourable throughout the fore-
cast period. Capacity utilization is rising, but on
average its level will still be too low to begin to
expect tensions. Although wages will be in-
creasing at a slightly faster pace next year they14
will exert no significant pressure on price infla-
tion. Energy and raw material prices are also
expected to pick up only slightly in 1999. The
main difference with respect to inflation in
1999 will be that labour costs and raw material
prices will no longer put a downward pressure
on prices.
b. Special Country Reports
Germany: Upswing Continues at a Moderate
Pace
After a slowdown in the final quarter of 1997,
economic activity picked up again in the first
quarter of 1998. Real GDP expanded at an an-
nualized rate of slightly more than 4 per cent,
benefitting from mild winter weather and ad-
vance purchases of consumers due to the VAT
hike on April 1. Besides consumption, also in-
vestment performed strongly as companies have
started to enlarge capacities. The price climate
remained rather favourable, in April consumer
prices were only 1.4 per cent higher than a year
ago. The labour market has shown clear signs
of a turnaround; in the first four months unem-
ployment fell by 139,000.
Fiscal policy in 1998 and in 1999 will be
more or less neutral, contrary to 1997, when it
had a strong dampening impact on economic
activity. At the beginning of April, the VAT
rate on most products was raised by 1 percen-
tage point. However, there will be no additional
burden for private households since at the be-
ginning of this year the surcharge on the in-
come tax was reduced and the tax-free subsis-
tence level was raised. Next year, a tax reform
is likely to be implemented; however, indepen-
dent of the new government a sizable net tax
relief is not likely to occur. Public expenditures
which were stagnating last year will again show
a slight increase this year as well as next year.
Table 6 - Real Gross Domestic Product, Consumer Prices, and Unemployment Rates, 1997-1999
























































































































































































































Source: OECD, EBCA estimates.15
Wage increases which have decelerated mar-
kedly in the last two years will accelerate
slightly this year and next year. After a mere
1.4 per cent rise in 1997 the increase in overall
hourly contractual wages is likely to average
2.0 per cent this year and 2.6 per cent next year.
Contrary to the previous years, non-wage la-
bour costs will not rise faster than contractual
labour costs. In line with the continuing up-
swing, in 1998 unit labour costs will again be
somewhat lower than last year, in 1999 a small
increase is likely to occur.
The overall conditions for a continued up-
swing in Germany are favourable. Real GDP in
1998 as well as in 1999 will expand at a pace
slightly above the growth rate of potential out-
put (2.3 per cent). The rather rapid export
growth of last year is likely to slow down some-
what as the economic turmoil in Southeast Asia
will cut exports over the coming 18 months by
about 2 percentage points. However, this is
more than compensated by a pick-up of dom-
estic demand. Especially investment in plant
and machinery is likely to expand more rapidly
as profits continue to rise and more and more
capacity constraints show up. Helped by faster
rising real disposable income, private consump-
tion will increase at a solid 2 per cent growth
rate after having been virtually stagnant last
year. In line with the ongoing recovery, em-
ployment is likely to rise again. Unemployment
in 1999 will decrease significantly; this is partly
due to a pronounced decline in the labour sup-
ply. Inflation will remain low this year and
slightly pick up next year. The main reason for
the higher inflation rate in 1999 (1.8 per cent
instead of 1.4 per cent in 1998) is that the dam-
pening impact of the decline in raw material
prices and in unit labour costs will run out
(Table 6).
Low Inflation in France
Foreign trade was the component driving the
economy last year. It contributed to 1.5 out of
2.5 per cent of GDP growth. At the beginning
of 1997 domestic demand was weak and net ex-
ports were the only GDP component to sustain
growth. Households' income and hence con-
sumption were hampered by past tax rises, slug-
gish employment growth, and efforts to control
health expenditure. At the end of 1997 as the
tax burden on households eased and confidence
remained at a high level, private consumption
sharply accelerated. Moreover, business confi-
dence has stabilized at a high level since De-
cember 1997 in all sectors. Thus, all domestic
demand components should show some growth
in the first half of this year.
The public finance situation has changed
much since summer 1997. New fiscal measures
and the revival of growth have increased public
receipts. Emergency measures of last August in-
cluded a temporary contribution of 15 per cent
on corporate taxes as well as the extension of
the tax base to the long-term capital gains incur-
red with the sale of fixed assets. Also expendi-
tures were cut to limit the public deficit to 3 per
cent of GDP. The draft budget for 1998 as-
sumes that stronger growth will be used to re-
duce the deficit, in order to regain margins of
manoeuvre in case of future recessions The re-
vival of growth should allow for stronger fiscal
receipts, at unchanged fiscal pressure. Benefit-
ting from lower interest rates and smaller defi-
cits, the debt burden will grow more slowly
than in the past. On the whole, the public deficit
on EMU definition could reach 2.6 per cent of
GDP in 1998 and 2.2 per cent in 1999.
Since 1994, unit labour costs in the whole
economy have grown only very slowly at an an-
nual growth rate of 0.5 per cent. Although the
return of net job creation in 1995 put for a
while a brake on productivity gains, labour
costs have continually slowed down since the
first quarter of 1996 and diminished in 1997.
More job creations in 1998 would raise labour
costs in 1998 albeit moderately: the real aver-
age hourly wage would grow by 1.6 per cent in
1998 and slightly less in 1999.
Consumer price inflation is moderating de-
spite the cyclical upturn. Prices will rise by 1.0
per cent in 1998 and 1999. The sustained com-
petition, fairly stable labour costs, and no pres-
sure from raw material prices considerably
lighten production costs.
In 1998 and 1999, the contribution of net ex-
ports is expected to turn slightly negative as ex-
ports slow down and imports accelerate. The16
smaller contribution of external demand to
growth will be largely compensated by stronger
domestic demand. GDP growth is projected at 3
per cent this year, slowing down to 2.7 per cent
in 1999. The purchasing power of the house-
holds will increase this year and next year at the
same rate (2.3 per cent). The most dynamic
component of income will be wages, in 1998 as
in 1999, especially due to job creation. In this
favourable environment, the financial savings
rate is expected to fall to around 6 per cent in
1998 and 1999.
As the impeding factors for investment (wait-
and-see posture of entrepreneurs remembering
the shocks of the early 1990s and looking for a
higher profitability) will be lifted by the
strengthening of demand, a more significant up-
turn is expected soon. The investment volume
will grow by 5.6 per cent in 1998 and 7.6 per
cent in 1999. This revival will remain broadly
self-financed.
As growth develops, the number of new jobs
may reach 370,000 in 1998 and 230,000 in 1999,
after 155,000 in 1997. Given a continuing in-
crease in labour supply, unemployment will be
reduced by only 90,000 and 30,000 persons in
1998 and 1999, respectively. Still this is a large
reduction as compared to recent history. The
last time that unemployed diminished appre-
ciably was in 1988-1989, that decline amounted
to 80 000 persons in two years.
Recovery in Italy Is Developing
Italian economic activity continues to recover:
real GDP growth is expected to increase by
about 2.3 per cent in the first half of this year.
Once the special incentives for car purchase
end, consumption (which rose by 2.4 per cent in
1997) will be sustained by high consumer con-
fidence. The most dynamic component of dom-
estic demand, however, has become fixed in-
vestments, both in plant and machinery and in
buildings. Stockbuilding now seems at a normal
level. In the first months of 1998, imports grew
strongly, while exports stabilized at the level of
year-end 1997, partly reflecting the Asian
crisis. In spite of the recovery in demand infla-
tion remains low: the average increase of con-
sumer prices between January and April was
1.7 per cent at annual rate. Although very slow-
ly, the labour market is improving, with rising
employment and falling unemployment.
The 1998 Budget Law and the stabilization
programme for the years ahead do not imply
any change in the fiscal policy stance. Rather it
is aimed at consolidating the results achieved so
far, by making permanent the temporary meas-
ures from the 1997 budget (about 1 per cent of
GDP) and reinforcing structural adjustment. For
1998 a budget deficit is projected at 2.8 per cent
of GDP, obtained with a reduction in expendi-
tures and an increase in revenues. Nevertheless,
thanks to falling interest rates and increasing
GDP, budget policy will not be more restrictive
than in 1998. The public current balance is ex-
pected to show a surplus of 0.9 per cent of GDP
(a government saving for the first time since the
beginning of the seventies), in spite of interest
expenditures amounting to 8 per cent of GDP.
This could imply a reduction in the fiscal pres-
sure of around 1 percentage point. The public
debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to reach 114 per
cent in 1999, which means a reduction of 7 per-
centage points in two years, thanks to lower in-
terest rates, stronger economic activity, and pri-
vatization and sales of public real estate.
Nominal wage growth could remain at some
3.5 per cent both this year and next, given the
weak labour market and the expectation of sus-
tained low inflation. An acceleration of labour
productivity will allow labour cost increases
well below 2 per cent in 1998-1999. Lower real
interest rates will foster a GDP growth of around
2.5 per cent in 1998 and 3 per cent in 1999,
without strong inflationary pressures. With low
imported inflation and moderate growth in unit
labour costs consumer price inflation will fluc-
tuate around 2 per cent. In 1999 consumption
should increase again as strongly as GDP, stimu-
lated by gains in real disposable income, low
interest rates, and improving labour market con-
ditions. Employment will grow at 0.6 per cent
in the next two years. Standardized unemploy-
ment will fall gradually from 12.1 per cent in
1997 to 11.6 per cent in 1999.
Investment in machinery and equipment will
rise by nearly 6 per cent this year and 9 per cent
in 1999, supported by strengthening demand, a17
high level of capacity utilization and declining
interest rates. Moreover, financial stability has
improved the situation in Italy: less uncertainty
about public deficit reduction, more favourable
conditions in the capital markets accompanied
by a strong performance in the equity market,
and the implementation of reforms aimed at in-
creasing competition and productivity, especial-
ly in the non-tradeable sectors. Growth in hous-
ing investment is expected to show a marked re-
covery, thanks to incentives for restructuring re-
sidential buildings, while also public invest-
ment in infrastructure will rise again signifi-
cantly. On the external side, the current account
surplus is expected to remain stable, and Italy
will become a net international creditor this
year.
The United Kingdom: Slowdown of Economic
Activity
The UK has now enjoyed five years of strong
economic growth following the sharp recession
of 1990-92. Unemployment has fallen marked-
ly over this period from 10.4 per cent in 1993 to
5.7 per cent last year. The rapid growth has not
been accompanied by any marked pick-up in in-
flation. Indeed inflation, as measured by the con-
sumption deflator, has eased markedly from 7.5
per cent in 1991 to 2.1 per cent last year.
The rapid decline in unemployment has led
to concerns that labour shortages may begin to
put upward pressure on wages and prices. Thus
monetary policy was tightened following the
election of the Blair administration in May
1997. One of its first acts was to give greater in-
dependence to the Bank of England. Since then
its monetary policy committee has steadily
raised short-term interest rates from 6 per cent
to 7.25 per cent. The bank has been particularly
concerned about the strength of consumer spen-
ding which grew by 4.6 per cent last year, sup-
ported by the gains in consumers' net wealth
stemming from the windfall profits from build-
ing society conversions and the generalized rise
in equity prices.
There are mixed signals coming from the la-
bour market with regard to inflationary pres-
sures. Average earnings growth has picked up
as unemployment has fallen with average earn-
ings rising by around 4.8 per cent last year, the
fastest rate of growth since 1992. However, some
of this increase is due to higher overtime pay-
ments and bonuses, reflecting the overall buoy-
ancy of the economy. The rate of growth of pay
settlements remained around 3 per cent, al-
though recent figures suggest, that pay settle-
ments may now be beginning to accelerate some-
what. Measured inflation is also giving con-
fusing signals. The retail price index (RPI) has
recently accelerated to 4 per cent but underlying
inflation, once temporary factors have been re-
moved, is growing far more modestly.
Fiscal policy has tightened significantly in
recent years. The public sector borrowing re-
quirement (PSBR) has been reduced from ap-
proaching 8 per cent of GDP in 1993 to virtual
balance last year (although the EMU deficit was
1.9 per cent last year). The recent improvement
has been particularly marked with the PSBR
improving by 2.8 per cent of GDP over the last
year. Half of the improvement is due to budg-
etary measures introduced by 1997 budget plan.
The remainder comes from previous measures
and from lower-than-expected government
spending.
Overall the UK is likely to enjoy a soft land-
ing with growth slowing to around 2 per cent
this year and 1.5 per cent in 1999. Inflation
should remain close to the target of 2.5 per cent.
However, there is a significant chance that the
economy will slow more quickly than expected
under the combined influence of tight monetary
and fiscal policy and a high exchange rate. It is
unlikely though that there will be a marked
pick-up in unemployment. The government's
Welfare to Work Programme should reduce the
number of claimants without putting too much
upward pressure on wages. This is because the
policy, which involves providing training and
work experience, is targeted at the long-term
unemployed who may not fully participate in
the labour market. However, the beneficial ef-
fects of the Welfare to Work Programme may
be partially offset by the introduction of the na-
tional minimum wage in the spring of next year.
Depending on the rate chosen this may push up
wages and reduce employment.18
Strong Growth in Spain
The good economic performance since 1997
continued in the first quarter of 1998. GDP rose
by 1.3 per cent with a strong acceleration in
domestic demand. Consumer confidence re-
mained at a high level, while business surveys
became more optimistic. Industrial production
rose by 10.7 per cent year on year; also qualita-
tive indicators suggest a buoyant investment be-
haviour this year. The unemployment rate fell
to 19.6 per cent in March, contributing to con-
sumer confidence. The stable inflation in the
first quarter of 1998 (1.9 per cent on average)
has permitted a further cut in the discount rate.
Fiscal policy is expected to be accommoda-
ting this year, after several years of tightening.
Thanks to the continued decrease in interest
rates and the increase in revenues due to the fa-
vourable cyclical development the general go-
vernment deficit target for this year is reduced
to 2.2 per cent of GDP. The main factors af-
fecting revenues are a raise of tax rates on oil
and insurance premiums, an increase in advance
payments of self-employed, some cuts in in-
come tax are also to be introduced along with
private pension allowances; public spending
will be held in check by wage increases for civil
servants in line with the inflation target (2.1 per
cent).
In 1997 nominal wages rose by 2.7 per cent,
while the private consumption deflator in-
creased by 2.5 per cent. In .1998 wage rises are
expected to be moderate, given the low infla-
tion. Collective bargaining in January involving
around two and a half million workers resulted
in an agreement on a wage increase of 2.5 per
cent.
GDP growth is projected to remain strong in
1998 and 1999 at around 3.5 per cent, sup-
ported by a decline in interest rates and a less
tight fiscal policy. Private consumption should
accelerate, as wages increase in real terms and
unemployment falls, and consumer confidence
is improving. Private investment should also ac-
celerate in the light of a further reduction in in-
terest rates, improved profitability, and high
rates of capacity utilization. Stronger demand
from the Euroland countries, which represent
around 60 per cent of Spain's export markets,
should sustain Spanish exports in spite of
slower demand outside Europe and the weaker
dollar. In 1998 inflation should remain near the
target (2.1 per cent), thanks to low international
commodity prices. With economic activity
growing by over 3 per cent on an annual basis,
labour market conditions should improve. Un-
employment should gradually come down.
The Netherlands: Soft Landing of the Economy
The Netherlands' economy expanded by 3.3 per
cent last year accompanied by a considerable
job creation. Employment rose by 2.5 per cent
and the unemployment rate reached 6.5 per cent
of the labour force. However the Dutch figure
for the labour market is not as good as it looks,
because there is a considerable hidden unem-
ployment. Unlike in most European countries,
Dutch growth in 1997 was driven by domestic
demand, while net exports were seriously affec-
ted by the outbreak of swine fever. Private con-
sumption grew around 3.5 per cent, with a par-
ticularly strong demand for consumer durables.
Real disposable income of households rose sub-
stantially, largely because of the strong employ-
ment growth. Positive wealth effects through
the surges in house and share prices supported
consumption as well.
The public sector deficit fell to 1.3 per cent
of GDP in 1997. Government expenditure, as a
percentage of GDP, follows a downward trend,
mainly due to lower interest payments and
lower transfers to the unemployed. Both in the
past and the present year the burden of taxes
and social security premiums has been lowering
substantially, for 1998 a reduction of about 1
percentage point of GDP is expected. However,
this is not likely to continue, as a hike in social
security contributions is needed to strengthen
the capital base of the public insurance system.
The public deficit is expected to rise to about
1.75 per cent this year, but to fall back again to
below 1.5 per cent in 1999, largely reflecting
the improved balances of the social funds. Gross
public debt will fall steadily to below 70 per
cent of GDP in 1999.
Wage and price movements will remain mod-
erate. There are yet no clear signs of tensions
on the labour market. Despite falling unemploy-19
ment the rise in contractual wages was just over
2 per cent last year, and in the present and
coming year the increase will be edging up to 3
per cent.
GDP growth is projected to be above 3.5 per
cent this year and around 3 per cent in 1999. A
gradual slowing down of economic growth is
projected from the second half of this year on-
ward until late next year a quarterly rate of 2.5
will be reached which is about the potential
growth rate of the economy. Next year's easing
of economic growth will take place on the ex-
port as well as the domestic side. On the export
side this is due to slower market growth and
some weakening of Dutch price competitive-
ness. This year consumer demand will be
boosted by job growth and a substantial in-
crease in purchasing power, while in 1999 con-
sumption growth will slow for several reasons.
First, fewer new jobs are expected. Second,
purchasing power will rise much slower, as —
on present policies — there will be no more
burden relief from the fiscal side. Third, the
wealth effects on consumption growth will de-
cline. This year the cyclically sensitive invest-
ments will accelerate, given improved profitabi-
lity and rising capacity utilization. This will not
show up in the total investment figures, how-
ever, because major energy projects were com-
pleted last year, while investment in aircraft
will also be significantly down. In 1999 invest-
ment will weaken in line with lower output
growth.
Employment is expected to rise by 2.5 per
cent this year and a still respectable 1.7 per cent
in 1999; the unemployment rate will reach 4.0
per cent in 1999 (as regards the standardized
rate). The expected low level of unemployment
is not seen as an obstacle for sustained eco-
nomic growth. Bottlenecks can be avoided at
least for a while, thanks to the increased flexibi-
lity of the labour market, and the expectation
that the strong employment growth will en-
courage more people to enter the market and
part-timers to work longer hours.
3. Some Facts about Euroland
European Monetary Union and United States in
Comparison
The economies that from 1 January 1999 will
share the euro as common currency constitute
an economic area comparable in size to the
United States. In 1997, Euroland's population
was slightly larger than that of the United
States, whereas the GDP amounted to roughly
80 per cent of the US level as can be seen from
Table 7. The GDP composition shows some dif-
ferences in the allocation between domestic and
net foreign demand. In Euroland, private con-
sumption and investment were around 80 per
cent of GDP, whereas in the United States the
weight was higher at around 88 per cent. Euro-
land's economy is more open, with the sum of
exports and imports over GDP coming to
roughly 23 per cent as compared to 19 per cent
for the US. This result is partly due to trade
between Euroland and those countries like the
United Kingdom, Greece, Denmark, and
Sweden which will not join the European Mon-
etary Union, but are important trade partners.
These countries absorb more than 25 per cent of
EMU exports and are the suppliers of around 23
per cent of EMU imports. Hence from 1999 the
de facto euro area will presumably be larger
than that associated with the eleven official
members.
It is interesting to compare the geographical
composition of trade for Euroland and the Unit-
ed States. Asia, as a whole, represented around
30 per cent of the US export market, but only
17 per cent for Euroland. On the other hand,
Asia covered nearly 40 per cent of US imports
and only 22 per cent of Euroland's. Central and
Eastern Europe absorb 15 per cent of Euroland
exports but less than 2 per cent of US exports.
The same proportion applies to them as the
origin of imports.
Noticeable differences between Euroland and
the United States are also evident in the labour
market and in the general government budget.
Unemployment in Euroland was more than 12
per cent in 1997, whereas the United States is
close to full employment at 5 per cent. The differ-20
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ferent structure of the two labour markets is
clearest in participation rates which are around
13 percentage points higher in the United States
than in Euroland. The possible reasons vary
from the different welfare states in the two re-
gions to differing degrees of flexibility in the
respective labour markets. The situation in
Euroland is worse than in the United States
with respect to the general government budget.
According to the European Commission statis-
tics, in 1997 the public deficit for the euro re-
gion was around 2.5 per cent of GDP, with a
cumulated debt approximately equal to 75 per
cent of GDP, compared with a roughly bal-
anced budget in the United States and a debt of
around 60 per cent of GDP.
II. Economic Policy in Europe for the Short and the Medium Term
1. On the Implications of the
European Monetary Union for
Economic Policy
At the beginning of May, the heads of state de-
cided to start the Third Stage of EMU on
January 1, 1999 with eleven countries participa-
ting. Bilateral exchange rates will be fixed on
the basis of present ERM central rates, i.e. these
rates will be the conversion rates on December
31, 1998. The ecu will then be replaced by the
new currency, the euro, at a rate 1:1. Since June
the governing council of the ECB is de facto in
charge of monetary policy in Euroland, al-
though de jure monetary policy remains in na-
tional sovereignty until the end of the year.
The European Central Bank has a clear man-
date to ensure price level stability in the Euro-
pean Monetary Union. According to the Maast-
richt Treaty, the ECB is independent. The per-
sonal independence of the members of the ECB
council is an important element. However, the
dispute among the heads of state about the pre-
sidency has created concerns about political in-
terference.
With the introduction of the single currency,
the individual countries give up their national
sovereignty concerning monetary policy and the21
possibility to use this instrument in domestic
stabilization policy. It will also, for example,
not be possible for individual countries to pur-
sue an expansionary monetary policy with the
intention of stimulating the economy. By the
same token, it will not be possible to use ex-
change rate policies influencing real wages after
an external real shock. For many countries,
however, the transition into EMU does not im-
ply a major change because they have more or
less followed a unified monetary policy and
have held nominal exchange rates fairly stable
vis-a-vis the D-mark in recent years. All in all,
the European Monetary Union will function as
an economic entity. This will leave the neces-
sary adjustments in case of disturbances to the
markets and to other areas of economic policy.
Monetary policy in the EMU will be conduc-
ted according to the economic conditions in the
whole currency area, so the ECB will not be
able to take regional differences in the develop-
ment of income, prices, and employment into
consideration. A common monetary policy does
not imply that the business cycles of the partici-
pating countries will be fully synchronized in
the future. Fiscal policy and wages will con-
tinue to be determined in the individual econ-
omies and will therefore differ from country to
country. In addition, shocks from outside will
affect the individual economies differently be-
cause of differences in economic structure. Last
but not least, some economies are more sensi-
tive than others to interest rate changes because
of a higher share of lending at short-term or va-
riable interest rates and because of the diversity
of current financial structures. The single cur-
rency will over time reduce the differences be-
tween countries as a Euroland market for credit
is created and will hence make them similar in
terms of the impact of the common monetary
policy on output and on other macroeconomic
variables.
It will be very important that the ECB will
explain its policy not only to politicians but also
to the broad public and to financial markets.
Transparency can be achieved in various ways,
one being regular publications. In addition, both
the British and the US experience has shown
that, for example, the publications of the min-
utes of the council meetings may help to in-
crease the central bank's credibility. Also regu-
lar meetings with policymakers and the Euro-
pean Parliament can be helpful. Its accountabi-
lity does not mean, however, that there is politi-
cal interference or even political control.
The current ERM bilateral central exchange
rates of the EMU currencies have for most cur-
rencies already prevailed for several years with-
out creating major structural problems, indica-
ting that they are consistent with a sustainable
economic development in the EMU area as a
whole. Also, there has not been any speculation
against one of the participating currencies. How-
ever, the irrevocable fixing of nominal ex-
change rates within EMU does not mean that
the real exchange rates which are important for
the competitiveness will remain unchanged. In
particular, differences with respect to productiv-
ity growth as well as different price and wage
developments will lead to differences in infla-
tion and thus to real exchange rate changes,
although they are limited in size.
Apart from the consequences for the mone-
tary conditions, there are implications of EMU
for fiscal policy. The Stability Pact implies a
constraint for fiscal policy. Public sector defi-
cits will have to be reduced so that in the case
of recession the deficit-to-GDP ratio does not
exceed the level of 3 per cent. Therefore, in a
number of countries, among them the two larg-
est economies of Germany and France, the struc-
tural deficits will have to be reduced further. In
addition, the Pact calls for a balanced budget or
a surplus in the medium term. All in all, these
targets have the purpose to let the automatic sta-
bilizers work, i.e. to avoid, for example, a re-
strictive policy in the case of a recession. Be-
yond these limits for the overall measure of
budget deficits, the introduction of EMU does
not have any major consequences for fiscal pol-
icy. In particular, it does not call for a harmoni-
zation in the field of, for example, tax policies
or social policies.
The introduction of a single currency will not
have a major impact on employment. High un-
employment will continue to be the greatest chal-
lenge for economic policy in Europe. For a num-
ber of countries it will be necessary to continue22
their efforts in reducing unemployment for ex-
ample by means of reducing the growth of real
wages in the medium term and by raising the
flexibility of the labour markets. It would be
counterproductive to impose a common wage
policy for Europe, for example, in the form of
wage standards, because this would aggravate
the unemployment problems in countries with a
relatively low level or growth rate of productiv-
ity.
2. Monetary Policy
The European Central Bank will start to operate
at a time when the overall economic conditions
in Euroland are quite favourable and do not call
for drastic interest rate moves to counter major
imbalances. The capacity utilization in the EMU
area appears to be close to its historical average;
furthermore, the average inflation rate is quite
low and there is no immediate danger of an ac-
celeration of inflation.
According to the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB
has to keep the price level in the European
Monetary Union stable. Similar to the policy of
the Bundesbank and other central banks, the
ECB is likely to announce a target of 2 per cent
as being compatible with this goal. A higher
rate is not likely as it could easily be interpreted
by markets that the euro would be less stable
than major currencies in the recent past. With a
present inflation rate of about 1.5 per cent on
average for the EMU area, this would also im-
ply that the slight acceleration of inflation ex-
pected for 1999 will not call for a substantial
tightening. The ECB is likely to nevertheless
raise interest rates somewhat in order to demon-
strate its commitment. The expected increase
does not, however, mean that monetary policy
becomes restrictive but rather moves in the di-
rection of a neutral policy stance.
The ECB will have to decide quickly how to
turn its mandate for price stability into a con-
crete strategy for monetary policy. According
to the EMI, there are two possible strategies, an
intermediate monetary target and a direct infla-
tion target. A monetary target would follow the
long-standing strategy of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank. In the past, it allowed for an annual
money supply growth (in terms of M3) which
after taking into account the growth of potential
output and the medium-term change in the in-
come velocity of money would limit the in-
crease in the price level to 2 per cent. The mon-
etary target is based on a stable long-term rela-
tionship between money and prices. While this
stability obviously did not exist in a number of
European countries, for example Italy, it seems
— according to various empirical investigations
— to have prevailed in Germany. Other coun-
tries have more or less followed the policy of
the Deutsche Bundesbank by fixing the ex-
change rate of their currency against the D-
mark. By means of this policy, they have also
achieved a low rate of inflation. Whether the
demand for money in the EMU will be as stable
as in Germany is uncertain as in several coun-
tries, the demand for money showed structural
breaks. However, there are empirical studies in-
dicating that the money demand has been more
stable for groups of European countries than for
individual countries. Nevertheless, in the start-
up phase of EMU a greater volatility in the mon-
ey stock cannot be ruled out for several reasons:
with the enlargement of the currency area there
might be a reduction of currency holdings; also,
changes in the financial structures are likely to
lead to shifts in the portfolio; and finally, it is
uncertain which role the euro will play outside
the EMU countries or as an international re-
serve currency.
In view of these problems, the ECB is likely
not to focus on a monetary target alone but also
follow a direct inflation target. That means that
the ECB will monitor a set of indicators which
have a close correlation to future inflation. The
central bank has to have reliable information
how a change in these indicators will affect the
price level or to what extent the ECB has to
change its key interest rates in order not to miss
its inflation target. In practice, there is a lot of
common features between the two strategies,
with direct inflation targeting taking into ac-
count additional variables.
With respect to ensuring that monetary con-
ditions will be adequate to achieve price stabili-
ty, the ECB will face a lot of problems at the23
start. First, the statistical data basis for the new
currency area is less reliable than that for indi-
vidual countries. Second, the new monetary
policy regime can lead to portfolio shifts which
especially in the beginning might affect mon-
etary aggregates. Third, most importantly, inter-
est rate changes affect the individual economies
with different speed and different intensity.
This makes it difficult to estimate the impact on
overall economic activity and prices. In addi-
tion, it can lead to tensions in the decision-mak-
ing process of the ECB. However, most of the
problems will be transitory. There will soon be
harmonized statistical data comparable to the
standards in the individual countries. Increasing
competition in the financial sector will narrow
the differences in the financial structures and
thus in the transmission process in EMU coun-
tries.
In the meantime, the ECB will carefully look
at all factors affecting the price climate. With
monetary aggregates likely to be influenced by
portfolio shifts, the development of short- and
long-term interest rates will be of special im-
portance for a judgement on the current stance
of monetary policy. It is the level of real and
not of nominal interest rates that matters, but
that cannot be influenced by central bank in the
long term. Since it is difficult to calculate real
interest rates and as there is no clear indication
what their "normal" level is, the yield curve has
become a very common indicator with respect
to assessing the impact of monetary policy on
economic activity. If the difference between the
10-year bond yield and the 3-month money mar-
ket rate is above (below) its long-term average
this normally indicates an expansionary (restric-
tive) stance of monetary policy. In order to get
an estimate of the neutral yield spread, the ECB
may take the experience in Germany as a guide-
line. Here, the long-run difference between long-
and short-term interest rates amounted to about
one percentage point on average. Some of the
other European countries show a significantly
lower long-term average. This is mainly due to
the fact that from time to time they had to raise
short-term interest rates significantly in order to
defend their exchange rates in the EMS; also,
the strong convergence of long-term rates in the
advance of EMU reduced the spread in a num-
ber of countries. At present, the difference be-
tween long- and short-term interest rates in the
D-mark bloc amounts to about 1.3 percentage
points thus indicating a relatively relaxed stance
of monetary policy.
Real long-term interest rates are central to in-
vestments and thus to the growth trend. These
rates are the results of market forces but eco-
nomic policy may influence them. It will thus
be highly desirable that the ECB and the govern-
ments give clear messages to borrowers and
lenders. This implies a reciprocal knowledge of
intentions, an understanding of the interactions
of expected policy stances , and as high as pos-
sible an agreement about the cyclical position
of countries.
A single interest rate in the EMU area will
have quite different consequences for the cycli-
cal development in the individual countries be-
cause the situation, for example, in terms of in-
flation and the output gap differs considerably.
Calculations using the "Taylor-rule" for mon-
etary policy suggest that the average short-term
interest rate in the EMU countries of 4 per cent
is too low for countries that are ahead in the
business cycle (e.g. Ireland and the Nether-
lands) and too high for those countries that are
lagging behind (e.g. France and Germany).
Therefore the common interest rate prevailing
in EMU may turn out to be stimulative in some
countries and dampening in others (Table 8).
The ECB will also watch the real sector of
the economy. In the case of emerging tensions,
indicated by a high level of capacity utilization
and faster growing labour costs, an acceleration
of inflation is likely to occur sooner or later. At
present there are hardly any signs of substantial
bottlenecks in the EMU countries as a whole.
However, in some countries, notably Ireland,
and Spain, there is a risk of strong growth turn-
ing into an overheating.
In order to achieve its monetary goals the
ECB will act in a way similar to the national
central banks in the past strongly relying on
open market operations to control liquidity
growth, steering interest rates and signalling the
stance of monetary policy. According to a pro-
posal of the EMI, the ECB will conduct differ-24
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ent types of open market operations. The most
important instrument will be a two-week tender
with repurchase agreement which allows the
ECB to influence daily money market rates. In
addition to that, standing facilities like a mar-
ginal lending facility and a deposit facility will
determine the upper and the lower range of the
short-term interest rate spectrum. Changes in
the respective interest rates will have a signal
character.
It is not decided yet whether the European
commercial banks will be subject to minimum
reserve requirements. There may be good argu-
ments in favour of minimum reserve require-
ments. They act as a buffer and thus stabilize
money market rates. In addition, they strength-
en the control of the ECB on banking liquidity
and thus make it easier for the central bank to
achieve its goals. However, in the past mini-
mum reserves in Germany have given incen-
tives to shift banking activities to offshore cen-
tres outside the country where no minimum re-
serves were required. Such a loss of competi-
tiveness can be avoided if market interest rates
are paid on minimum reserves.
The European Central Bank is likely to intro-
duce a minimum reserve requirement, charac-
terized by a reserve requirement on deposits of
between 2 per cent and 3 per cent, with a re-
serve remuneration close to money market
rates. This will create, for example, in Italy a
transition problem, as at present the minimum
reserve rate in Italy amounts to 15 per cent. The
new requirement rate would imply reducing re-
serves by approximately 60 thousand billions of
lira, slightly less than 30 billion ecu. Huge a-
mounts of liquidity would then be released in a
single move at the beginning of 1999. However,
it would be easier to sterilize the freed liquidity
and thus to avoid a swing in short-term interest
rates if the minimum reserve rate were reduced
in tranches. The best timing for this would be
June and December when there is normally a
strong demand for liquidity due to major tax
and social security payments.
3. Exchange Rate Policies of the Non-
EMU Members of the EU
The decision of the eleven member states to
press ahead with the single currency raises im-
portant questions for the four countries outside
the monetary union. The UK, Sweden, Den-
mark, and Greece need to decide when and if
they should join the EMU and what their ex-
change rate policies should be in the inter-
vening period. They have to take account of
both real developments and the progress of in-
flation. Joining EMU at an overvalued ex-
change rate, or at one where inflation would
rise relative to the rest of the Union would have25
undesirable long-run consequences for markets
share and import penetration. Joining at too low
a rate would induce inflation and defeat one ob-
jective of a stable and independent monetary
authority. Although inflation rates will not di-
verge significantly in EMU, they can do so for
long periods as some regions overcome under-
valuations and others change the balance of
demand in response to lower interest rates.
It seems most likely for the UK that a bid to
join EMU will be made following the next gen-
eral election, likely in 2001/02. Current market
expectations suggest an entry rate with respect
to the D-mark of a little over DM 2.60. Sweden
and Denmark are likely to try to join EMU if
and when popular support can be secured.
Greece, which failed to meet the Maastricht
convergence criteria, is likely to join EMU
when it has made sufficient progress towards
reducing inflation and improving the fiscal
position.
These four countries face differing questions
about the appropriate exchange rate policy in
the period before they join. Two countries are
likely to participate in the successor to the Ex-
change Rate Mechanism, ERM II, namely Den
:
mark and Greece, whilst Sweden and the UK
may stand outside, at least for the time being. It
would appear likely that the Danish authorities
will seek to maintain their currency's parity
with the euro until they choose to join the
single currency. Long-term interest rates are
slightly above those for the ecu, suggesting that
the markets expect short-term interest rates to
move in line with those in the rest of Europe.
Moreover, the European Monetary Institute has
indicated that it will take account of conditions
in the Danish economy when it sets euro in-
terest rates. All in all Denmark is likely to be a
de facto member of the monetary union right
from the start, and will become a de jure mem-
ber as soon as the population is ready for it to
do so.
Despite improvements, Greece is not expec-
ted to be so successful in maintaining parity
with the euro. The authorities will continue to
follow a policy of using a relatively strong ex-
change rate to put downward pressure on infla-
tion, but it will take some time for inflation to
be reduced to the euro area rate of below 2 per
cent. During this period short-term interest rates
in Greece are likely to be above those in the rest
of Europe, and hence the exchange rate can be
expected to decline steadily. Exchange control
to the drachma market makes it easier for the
authorities to manage the exchange rate. How-
ever, EMU membership will require the prior
removal of these controls, and possibly more
exchange rate instability before entrance.
The UK and Sweden are likely, for the time
being, to stand aside from both the euro and the
ERM II. The UK is unlikely to rejoin the ERM
at least in the short term. It would be politically
and economically difficult for the UK not to de-
lay re-entry into the ERM, even though the pre-
sent administration shows a much more positive
attitude to Europe than its predecessor. Institu-
tional change has begun in preparation for po-
tential membership. The Bank of England has
been made genuinely independent, and finan-
cial sector regulation is to split of, much as is
required for membership of EMU.
There are major economic obstacles in the
way of immediate entry. Cyclical positions dif-
fer. The economies of continental Europe are
possibly below capacity output, but are recover-
ing. The UK economy is operating at or above
full capacity, and in recent months the inflation
rate has been at or above its median target. In
these circumstances we would expect the Bank
to be raising interest rates, but this might cause
the exchange rate to appreciate, and sterling is
overvalued already.
The situation in 1998 is worrying. Estimates
of the equilibrium exchange rate suggest that a
bilateral rate of DM 2.5 to 2.6 per pound would
be the maximum that would be sustainable gi-
ven current price levels. Joining at rates seen in
early 1998 would have meant that the exchange
rate would have been 15 per cent or more over-
valued.
The UK cannot go into EMU at the present
rate. If it devalues then all the inflationary pres-
sure held in check by the appreciation of 1996
will re-emerge. Inflation would rise, and if the
exchange rate fell to 2.5 DM, it could well ex-
ceed 4 per cent for several years, and hence a
real overvaluation would re-emerge. Contrac-
tionary monetary policy would be counterpro-
ductive, as it would raise the exchange rate26
again. The only option left appears to be a tight-
ening of fiscal policy. Calculations by NIESR
suggest that a substantial fiscal tightening would
be necessary to ensure that the exchange rate
was sustainable upon entry into EMU in 2002.
The other major outsider faces a much less
onerous choice. Sweden left the ERM soon
after the UK, and experienced a larger subse-
quent devaluation. In late 1995 it appreciated a
little against other currencies, and since then it
has maintained an approximately stable ex-
change rate at around what appears to be a sus-
tainable level. Sweden's exchange rate policy is
based on making all the necessary preparations
so that it can join the euro at a year's notice.
This will require certain legislative measures,
including increased independence for the Riks-
bank (due in 1999) and a stable exchange rate
against the euro.
Exchange rate developments in the two north-
ern outsiders will of course be subject to the
vagaries of the market. Both countries have
maintained inflation targets around the same as
those set in Germany or to be set by the ECB.
The effects of the targeting regime on the ex-
change rate depends, inter alia, upon the credi-
bility of the Banks and the degree to which they
will allow inflationary or deflationary shocks to
affect the price level in the long run. If they ac-
commodate inflation shocks, we cannot be cer-
tain where the exchange rate will end up, but if
they do not, then the current rate may be a good
indicator of the long-run rate. This would ap-
pear to be wise in the case of Sweden, but to be
of limited value for the UK. The former country
is at about its equilibrium exchange rate, and
has the same inflation target as the ECB. Hence
membership is sustainable. The UK has a more
complicated choice to make.
4. Fiscal Policy
a. On the Consequences of the Stability
Pact
In 1997, fiscal policy in the prospective EMU
countries was struggling to keep the budget de-
ficit within the 3 per cent limit set in the Maast-
richt Treaty. With the exception of Greece, all
countries which wanted to participate succeed-
ed. To accomplish this task, taxes and social se-
curity contributions were raised and expendi-
tures were cut. However, several countries have
adopted one-time measures, for example special
taxes were levied and expenditures were post-
poned into 1998. In addition, most of the coun-
tries benefitted from the cyclical upswing and
declining interest rates. In Italy and Belgium,
the debt-to-GDP ratio declined but is still twice
as high as the reference value in the Treaty. All
this has created fears that the fiscal adjustment
in the EMU member states will not be sus-
tainable.
In order to avoid that large fiscal deficits in
one country have negative externalities for
other EMU countries, the member states have
committed themselves to keep budget deficits
within 3 per cent of GDP unless there are ex-
ceptional circumstances such as a severe reces-
sion. Furthermore, the Pact calls for a balanced
budget or even a slight surplus in the medium
term. The practical implication of the Pact is
that in order to avoid fines in the case of a
downturn the countries in a normal cyclical
situation have to have a budget deficit that is
well below 3 per cent. Otherwise there would
be no room for the working of the automatic
built-in-stabilizers. With the loss of monetary
autonomy of member states, the importance of
fiscal stabilizers has increased.
In the past, the individual countries have
shown differences in the size of output varia-
tions, also the present position in the business
cycle varies. In general, the actual and the struc-
tural deficits in 1997 were below 3 per cent
(Table 9). In many countries, the structural
primary balance was significantly positive, be-
cause of the restrictions implied by the Stability
Pact. However, in most countries structural de-
ficits were still significantly higher than would
be sufficient to allow for a working of the auto-
matic fiscal stabilizers in the case of a reces-
sion. As a consequence, further consolidation
efforts are necessary in most of the countries.27
Table 9 - Indicators of Fiscal Position in EU Countries, 1997
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Source: OECD, EBCA estimates.
Trying to reach balanced budgets as soon as
possible is widely recognized as a pre-requisite
for recapturing margins of manoeuvre in case of
future slumps. However, in the long run, ba-
lanced budgets are not necessarily, from an eco-
nomic point of view, the best of all worlds.
Although in many countries the debt-to-GDP
ratio was above 60 per cent, the heads of state
decided at their meeting in early May that the
debt criterion was satisfied in all countries. Ac-
cording to the Maastricht Treaty, the reference
is that "the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory
speed". In their convergence reports the EMI
and the central banks shared this view. How-
ever, with respect to the highly indebted coun-
tries Italy and Belgium with a debt to GDP ratio
of approximately 120 per cent, there was some
skepticism about the sustainability of the fiscal
position. Without additional efforts, it would
take about 15 to 20 years before the debt-to-
GDP ratio is back to the target value of 60 per
cent. In the meantime, the budgets of the two
countries will be very sensitive to interest rate
changes.
The risk that the high indebtedness will have
negative consequences for the stability of the
euro and for other countries is low. With an in-
dependent ECB it will not be possible to reduce
the real value of long-term government liabili-
ties through inflating the economy. Also, the ef-
fect on interest rate will be limited as both
countries have relatively high savings. The "no-
bail-out clause" in the Treaty stipulates that
neither individual member states nor the com-
munity shall be liable for the commitments of
other government bodies. Furthermore, it is in
the interest of the countries themselves to re-
duce their debt ratio, this would not only lower
the risk premium in the interest rate, lower in-
terest payments would also give more scope for
fiscal policy in general.
Judging the fiscal sustainability is a difficult
task, particularly because all government liabili-
ties should be taken into account, not only those
explicit in the statistics. In almost all countries
the population is ageing. In the future, state
pension systems which operate on a pay-as-
you-go basis will face huge additional outlays
which cannot alone be financed through a re-
duction in benefits or an increase in contribu-
tions. Like the explicit debt, the implicit debt
will therefore put a further strain on public fi-
nances. As a consequence, not only Belgium
and Italy will have to take additional measures
in order to further consolidate public budgets.28
Box 3-A Minority View on Policy Coordination in EMU (By NIESR and OFCE)
Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Europe
The economic debate over policy has contained two strands. Some economists advocate that the monetary and fiscal
authorities should follow simple and transparent rules. These views stem from Milton Friedman in the 1950s, and he
described them as advocating a 'monetary constitution' for the USA. At the same time other economists, such as James
Meade, advocated a more discretion-based approach, where the authorities did not act in isolation and attempted to
maximize welfare over time. At present the European institutions are following the current trend and moving toward a
rule-based solution to policy setting. It is, however, generally recognized that Europe is in a completely new situation, and
we should expect the authorities to proceed with caution. The original debate on rules and discretion had one fiscal and
one monetary authority 'playing a game' to determine outcomes. The conduct of economic policy in EMU will raise some
new problems as there will be 1 ECB and 11 fiscal authorities. The 'game' is much more complex, and its progress will
have to be monitored carefully.
The Relationship between the ECB and National Governments
It cannot be denied that discordant monetary and fiscal policies may have harmful consequences, and they should be
guarded against in political discussions. A Euro Council has been set up to facilitate the dialogue amongst the euro
countries and between these countries and the ECB. Although the ECB is an independent body, it is not advisable that
monetary policy should be conducted completely independently of the fiscal authorities, and dialogue within the Council
should help to co-ordinate the actions of the authorities. They will have a difficult task in co-ordinating demand because a
given level of demand may result from various policy-mix, so choices have to be made.
There are a number of situations to consider. A negative shock may simultaneously hit all countries of the area, and
then monetary policy should help to sustain activity. However, the extent to which it may do so may depend upon the
average fiscal stance, and some countries may take on more of the burden of adjustment than others. As a result we may
see some 'free riders' who allow others to adjust whilst they do not. The Stability Pact does not give any prescription in
that case.
The ECB will fix a single interest rate that will apply to 11 countries even when there are asymmetric developments.
The average rate may not fit to the specific situation of the different countries, and hence the Euro-11 Council will have to
play an important role to reconcile the objectives of differing European countries. If some countries are overheating then
they should take appropriate fiscal action rather than ECB increase euro interest rates. In the reverse case a country hit by a
specific negative shock will have to act alone with expansionary fiscal policy whilst respecting the constraints of the
Stability Pact. Given the loss of monetary autonomy the member states will clearly have a greater need for counter-
cyclical fiscal policy, and this will have to be carefully monitored by the Euro Council, who should not encourage aberrant
behaviour. However, cohesive fiscal policy setting is not the only problem that a new Europe may face. We are in a new
world with many uncertainties.
The setting of fiscal targets will have to fulfil three roles, and they may conflict, and hence there is a debate that must
continue as the monetary and fiscal constitution of the new Europe is constructed. Fiscal policy must respect the Stability
Pact, and it must also take account of the maintenance of optimal government finance in the long run. Finally, in our new
world with harmonized monetary policy we see a need for more active counter-cyclical fiscal policy. All three objectives
need to be transparent. There are few reasons why governments should borrow (or lend) except to finance investment, and
prudence requires an acknowledgement of longer-term commitments to pensions and other expenditure. The Stability Pact
sets sensible opening guidelines for the setting of fiscal policy as EMU is built, but as the years pass and the regime settles,
we would expect there to be a discussion on sensible fiscal polices that is wider than the current discussion. It is best if
such a discussion start now so that debt can be restrained to acceptable levels quickly.
Monetary Policy Targets
It is widely agreed that the ultimate target of monetary policy is price stability, but we are aware that the ECB will take
account of other developments in the short run. Those who believe in rules often argue for the publication of relatively
simple and transparent rules, where the interest rate would vary with inflation, output and unemployment. However, the
ECB may choose to have a target for the money supply, and also take account of inflation developments in the short run.
Clearly the ECB will act with caution. It appears that European-wide money demand is stable, but targeting it has not been
tried before. We all know that money demand is subject to shocks that may only be due to portfolio reallocations resulting
from financial innovations or from changes in taxation. These shocks may be more common in the transition phase after
EMU is set up. The ECB should be cautious when setting money supply target as it may have to permanently modify
them, and it should make it clear that its ultimate goal, price stability, will dominate its commitment to an uncertain inter-
mediate target. It has to accept the uncertainties in the new situation.29
b. On Tax Harmonization
The single market and the common currency
could strengthen fiscal competition in Europe.
Some countries could decide to lower tax rates
to attract capital and qualified labour. Firms,
workers, and the high-income earners have the
opportunity to choose in which country they are
going to pay taxes, while benefitting from pub-
lic expenses in a more generous country. Such a
fiscal competition may force nations to choose
between cutting back on public spending, and
taxation exclusively based on immobile factors
(like real estate or unqualified workers). In face
of this problem, three views can be presented.
According to the decentralized approach, the
fact that a single currency exists for Europe and
that monetary policy is now harmonized does
not imply that fiscal harmonization is necessary
as well. The choice of the appropriate system
should be left to the individual countries and
not be limited by a "European standard". In
each country, there are — to a different degree
— distortions in the tax and welfare benefit sys-
tems, which are an impediment for higher
growth and higher employment. Successful
strategies of reducing these distortions can be
copied by other countries with a positive effect
on growth and employment. Such a process of
learning can therefore be productive for the in-
dividual countries and for Europe as a whole.
This process would not be possible if there was
a far-reaching harmonization of tax rates or tax
systems. If tax systems were more or less the
same, it would also be more difficult for coun-
tries with a relatively low income to catch up
with richer countries. Tax competition would
therefore be favourable for integration in Eu-
rope. De facto there has already been tax com-
petition in Europe but the tax burden in most
economies is nevertheless high. Also in the
future, competition with respect to tax levels
will not lead to a "race to the bottom". The go-
vernment as well as the population in each
country have an interest that public goods such
as investment in infrastructure are provided at a
scale which is supportive for economic growth.
The introduction of social standards, unless
they are set at the lowest possible level, would
hamper the economic development of countries
with a relatively low level of productivity.
These countries with a relatively low living
standard could not afford paying high social ex-
penditures without having to accept lower eco-
nomic growth and higher unemployment. In the
European Monetary Union, it will and should
be possible to have different levels of govern-
ment expenditures, different tax systems as well
as different social systems. They are the natural
result of different preferences among the coun-
tries on the one hand and different levels of in-
come and productivity on the other.
From a federalist point of view, an optimal
tax system and a social security system should
be settled at the European level to which coun-
tries would have to conform. Europe, as a rela-
tively closed economy, could determine its so-
cial model. However, social, economic, and po-
litical integration have not reached a degree at
which European peoples will accept taxation
and social security be defined at a European
level. The present differences in living stand-
ards do not permit a single social legislation:
the poorer countries cannot be forced to adopt
the living standards of the richest countries, in
terms of wages or minimum income. In the long
run (that is to say, roughly in 20 years), this
question will be raised. A higher degree of la-
bour mobility may force social legislation har-
monization (for instance pension systems and
unemployment benefits). If political union in
Europe were to develop, common taxation and
public spending would have to be settled to in-
crease the European citizenship. Yet, such a re-
quirement is only to appear in the future.
A more pragmatic approach can be a gradual
harmonization. This process would try to pre-
serve national sovereignty as much as possible
at each step towards European unification, both
on taxation and on spending policy, while co-
ordinating taxation on the most mobile factors
to avoid that tax payers individually choose tax-
ation. According to this view optimal taxation
cannot emerge from a market process, since
when totally free, each tax payer behaves as a
free rider. For instance, young people, educated
in France, where education is free, and having
received family allowances, may decide to30
work in the United Kingdom, where taxes on
labour are low, while their parents benefit from
the French public retirement system. A German
resident with savings in Luxembourg could
keep on benefitting from public expenditures in
Germany. The rich could escape any redistribu-
tion tax, even if assistance dedicated to the
poorer has, socially speaking, to be considered
in terms of social cohesion. National systems
may be subject to competition, but this competi-
tion shall not be biased. Some would be satis-
fied if states were obliged to abandon public
spending and redistribution. But this opinion
may not be broadly shared in Europe. Follow-
ing this approach, some guidelines could be
proposed. Countries should remain sovereign as
regards labour and real estate taxation; the use
of tax havens should be kept under strict rules.
Capital income taxation should be harmonized,
either on the principle of declaration in the
country of origin, or with minimal tax rates on
non-resident savings. The European Union
should promote tax reforms, like increasing
ecotaxes while lowering employers' social con-
tributions on low wages. The VAT system may
remain unchanged as long as the differences in
national tax rates do not lead to significant
cross-country purchases. Taxes on profit should
be harmonized (minimum rate, taxation on prof-
its abroad); areas in difficulty could however be
entitled to have a lower tax rate.
5. On Social Policy and Wage Setting
in Europe
The introduction of the euro raises questions
about the need for reform of national labour
markets and social institutions. It removes one
of the last remaining barriers to the mobility of
capital, and hence changes the relative isolation
of individual labour markets. In particular it
raises questions about whether wages could be
harmonized across Euroland, or at the very least
should there be a co-ordination of wage bar-
gaining and the emergence of Euroland bar-
gaining institutions ?
a. Harmonizing Wages?
Wage rates differ substantially between the
members of the euro area. These differences re-
flect varying levels of productivity and national
income and differences between national insti-
tutions. If wage increases are harmonized but
productivity is not then production will move
between countries, and non-national multina-
tionals will find it easier to move than most
domestic firms.
In the service sector where wages are often
more strongly related to national income than
measures of physical productivity it is clear that
less affluent countries pay their hairdressers and
school teachers less than in wealthier countries.
There would clearly be a great danger that if
pay rates were forced up in lower-wage econ-
omies, a large fall in employment could be en-
gendered. If there were a desire to raise wages
in lower-productivity countries then the appro-
priate policy response would be to follow pol-
icies which raise productivity. These might in-
clude greater investment in education and train-
ing and perhaps incentives for physical invest-
ment. For the most part these would seem to be
questions for national governments, although
structural funds can help smaller and poorer
countries adjust, much as they have in Ireland.
It cannot be expected that productivity can be
raised significantly in a short period of time.
However, national labour market and social
institutions also matter in the determination of
wages. They affect the level of wages, the flexi-
bility of the labour market, and the speed of re-
sponse to changes in the external environment.
In the UK and the US, where institutions such
as trade unions, minimum wages, and social se-
curity have been weakened in recent years,
there has been a widening in earnings disper-
sion and a decline in the labour share of na-
tional income. Both economies show consider-
able labour mobility, with individuals moving
between firms more frequently than they do in,
say, France or Germany. This gives the US and
the UK more flexibility to respond to develop-
ments that change the number and size of firms
that can survive in an industry. However, in
other countries where such institutions have31
been maintained or enhanced we have not seen
the same developments in the distribution of
earnings. In addition, the continued existence of
employment protection has meant that employ-
ment levels are potentially higher but that actual
hours worked per person are lower and essen-
tially more variable than they are in the UK, for
instance. Other labour market institutions can
also compensate for a lack of labour turnover,
and these have meant that in Germany hours per
person and real wages per person hour have
varied more over the cycle than they have in the
UK, giving the economy a different form of fle-
xibility. Therefore, the question of harmonizing
institutional practices, rather than wages, may
be of greater interest.
b. Harmonizing Institutions and
Common Standards
There are forces at work that may lead to the
harmonization of some institutions in labour
markets. The Social Chapter, for instance, re-
quires some common approaches to non-wage
labour costs and to social protection. It is, how-
ever, questionable as to whether it is practical to
harmonize labour market and social institutions
across Europe. Member states have evolved dif-
ferent institutional frameworks and practices to
reflect national preferences and different cultu-
ral and historical traditions. These may be hard
to change as they are not reflected in legislation
and may not respond to it. Many countries have
centralized bargaining systems covering almost
all employees whilst other countries, most no-
tably the UK, have adopted much more decen-
tralized approaches to pay determination. Social
safety nets, employment protection, and mini-
mum wage provisions also vary considerably
between countries. It is clearly not possible to
harmonize such institutions in a short period of
time but it would be possible to perhaps set
some common standards and begin a process of
gradual harmonization.
There would appear to be two different and
apparently contradictory approaches to the
question of whether this would be a desirable
direction in which to go. One view would be
that the single currency will require a greater
degree of harmonization of wages and social in-
stitutions. The case for this is in some ways
similar to the arguments put forward for the So-
cial Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, as a ne-
cessary counterbalance to the competitive pres-
sures emerging from the creation of the Single
European Market. It is argued that without
common standards multinational employers,
when bargaining with disparate national trade
unions, may be able to drive down wages, as
the threat of relocation becomes more realistic.
However, there are clearly limits to the extent
to which such a threat is realistic. Wage rates
within the multinational will reflect different
national productivity levels that depend upon
the skills and capacities of the workforce and
on the general infrastructural environment in
which they work. However, the existence of the
forces of relocation is one of the factors that
will quickly help make changes in nominal
wages move more coherently than they have
done over the last decade. National institutions
affect national wage levels, and in turn affect
participation and unemployment levels, but they
are not immutable.
For instance, it is sometimes suggested that
countries may try to gain a competitive advan-
tage within the monetary union by lowering
wages and social benefits relative to other
member states. Supporters of this view point to
the Netherlands as an example of a country
which has pursued such a strategy. Following
the Wassenaar agreement in 1982, when Dutch
employers and trade unions agreed to moderate
pay increases in order to create more jobs, em-
ployment growth has been 1 per cent a year fas-
ter than in the rest of the EU. Over this period,
whilst the ERM parity has been maintained, the
real effective exchange rate in terms of unit la-
bour costs has depreciated by 10 per cent. It is
suggested that countries participating in the
euro may decide to follow the Dutch route to
competitive devaluation through lower wages.
If monetary union and a single currency lead to
the gradual breakdown of institutions that re-
strict choice within countries and concentrate
the benefits of high productivity amongst speci-
fic "insider" groups, then it may have served a
purpose in increasing welfare in the euro area.32
The alternative view would be that greater la-
bour market flexibility is essential if the single
currency is to function effectively. Once the
safety valve of national exchange rates has been
removed and restrictions are placed on fiscal
policy through the Stability Pact, national la-
bour markets will need to function more effec-
tively to ensure that unemployment is kept low.
For example, if unit labour costs and prices
grow more quickly in one country compared
with the euro area, then this country may rapid-
ly become uncompetitive as it faces an appre-
ciation in its real exchange rate. Relocation of
activity both within multinational firms and
within industries will result, and the combina-
tion of the removal of barriers in the Single
Market and the existence of a common currency
will speed these processes up. We have already
begun to see such forces at work in the automo-
tive industry, and they will spread quickly.
There is clearly a danger for some countries
at the start of EMU, such as Ireland, who are
growing much more rapidly than other coun-
tries in the euro area. To the extent that this
growth is driven by excess demand it will lead
to a rise in prices and wages relative to those in
the rest of Europe. Countries who find them-
selves in this position will need to demonstrate
considerable flexibility in both labour and pro-
duct markets if they are to avoid a long and
painful period of high unemployment. With the
considerable language and cultural barriers that
exist within the EU it is unlikely that these
problems will be solved by migration as has
been seen within the US. Supporters of this
view would argue that any attempt to harmo-
nize wage bargaining within Europe is likely to
restrict national labour market flexibility and
may condemn some countries to protracted
spells of high unemployment. Had common Eu-
ropean institutions existed in the early 1980s,
then it may not have been possible for the
Netherlands to address its then very serious un-
employment problem through a national agree-
ment on wages and employment. Moreover, it
is often argued that the introduction of the euro
strengthens the case for deregulation of Euro-
pean labour markets and reform of social safety
nets so that they do not create poverty traps.
It is clear from the above discussion that any
attempt to bring about a convergence in labour
market institutions must proceed with great cau-
tion. The framework of the Social Chapter
provides a mechanism for providing a baseline
of common standards for all member states. Al-
so if European trade unions and employers wish
to develop stronger international ties, then they
will be free to do so. However, any attempt to
harmonize wage rates across countries, not ac-
companied by a corresponding rise in produc-
tivity, should be resisted as this could jeopar-
dize the employment position of workers in
lower-wage economies. Also national bargain-
ing systems should remain, and arguably devel-
op further the ability to respond to local labour
market conditions. Without this national flexi-
bility, individual countries may be left with no
policy remedy for rising unemployment. This
could threaten the cohesiveness and ultimately
the continuation of the monetary union.